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“No witchcraft, no enemy action had silenced the rebirth of 
new life in this stricken world.  The people had done it 




The shellfish natural resource provides both economic 
and ecological benefits to the coastal regions of the United 
States.  However, urbanization and industrial activities harm 
the fragile coastal eco-system that sustains shellfish.2 This 
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1  Rachel Carson, Silent Spring, 3 (Houghton Miffin, 1962). 
2  Randy Lowell, Private Actions and Marine and Water Resources: 
Protection, Recovery and Remediation, 8 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 143, 146–47 
(2000).  “While humankind may still enjoy the right to the oceans and 
waterways, mankind's ability to enjoy the oceans and waterways has been 
severely hindered in modern times. With the Industrial Revolution and the 
staggering rate of increase in human population, industrialization, and 
resource consumption, the earth's capacity to sustain this rate has 
dwindled, with man having ‘followed an implicit policy of ignoring 
uncertain environmental risks until disaster hits.’” Id. (quoting Larry D. 
Silver, The Common Law of Environmental Risk and Some Recent 
Applications, 10 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 61, 62 (1986)).   




degradation reduces the availability and quality of the 
valuable shellfish resource.3 One of the primary culprits 
continually contaminating shellfish is the discharge of 
hazardous materials into coastal waterways, which ultimately 
accumulate in shellfish harvesting areas.4  These discharges 
give way to long term economic, ecological and human 
health problems.   
Plaintiffs who have been harmed by hazardous waste 
discharge of this nature have two major avenues for pursuing 
a claim against a polluter.  First, plaintiffs may rely on 
common law tort theories such as: nuisance, trespass, 
negligence or strict liability claims.5  More often than not, the 
causation element proves to be a major obstacle to the 
plaintiff when making a prima facie case. Thus, the claim 
may fail.6   
The more viable option for recovering natural resource 
damages resulting from the discharge of hazardous waste is 
to pursue a claim under the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (hereinafter 
“CERCLA”).7  Since there is much confusion regarding the 
parameters of the causation element in natural resource 
damage actions,8 CERCLA appears to be the more effective 
                                                 
3  Id. at 147 (“One-fourth of shellfish harvesting areas have been 
closed due to contamination”);  
See also Council on Environmental Quality, 25th Annual Report 225 
(1994), Protecting and Enhancing Shellfish Resources, 
http://www.buzzardsbay.org/shellac2.htm. (last visited March 7, 2006).  
4  See Table 1-1, Hazards and Risks of Seafood Consumption and 
Their Control Arranged According to Importance, in Institute of 
Medicine, Seafood Safety 4-5 (Farid E. Ahmed ed., 1991).  
5  Julie Mendel, CERCLA Section 107: An Examination of Causation, 
40 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 83, 84 (1991); Charles B. Anderson, 
Damage to Natural Resources and the Costs of the Restoration, 72 TUL. 
L. REV. 417, 420-426 (1997). 
6  Mendel, supra note 5.   
7  Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2002).  
8  The D.C. circuit court of appeals has determined that CERCLA is 
unclear on the issue of whether the causation standard should be less strict 
than that of the common law standard. State of Ohio v, U.S. Dept. of 




vehicle for compensating the public for damages to natural 
resources than those offered by traditional common law 
principles. 
The ultimate manifestations of hazardous waste pollution 
are unpredictable and long term.  The cleanup of a 
contaminated site may never return that site to its original 
condition.  Also, the damages recovered in a natural resource 
damage action may never fairly compensate the public, who 
bears the loss of the natural resources.9  Because of the 
speculative nature of the scientific evidence and conflicting 
standards used to substantiate such a claim, obtaining results 
favorable to both the environment and the public through the 
CERCLA process has proven cumbersome. 
In the case of shellfish contamination, the coastal 
shellfish harvesting areas tend not to be the primary 
hazardous waste sites.  Instead, the accumulation of 
contamination in the harvesting areas occurs incidentally to 
the activities taking place on adjacent waste disposal sites.  
Accordingly, gathering evidence of contamination on 
adjacent sites and creating the causal link between the release 
and the damage is more speculative.  Because the 
environmental damage can take years to materialize, the 
damage may not be capable of being accurately predicted 
until long after the initial contamination to an adjacent site 
                                                                                                     
Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 470-472 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The trial courts have 
also reached different conclusions regarding the standard for causation in 
natural resource damage actions. See In Re Acushnet River and New 
Bedford Harbor, 722 F.Supp. 893, 897 n. 8 (D. Mass 1989) citing O’Neil 
v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 179 n 4 (1st Cir. 1989) (the court concluded that 
the causation requirement of CERCLA’s section 107(a)(4)(C) could be 
met so long as the defendant’s actions were a “contributing factor” to the 
injury); see also State of Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F.Supp. 665, 674 
(D. Idaho 1986) (the court required a “casual link” between the release of 
hazardous substances and the alleged damages). 
9  John M. Heyde, Is Contingent Valuation Worth The Trouble?, 62 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 331, 334 (1995)(“[E]ven if a polluter is fully liable for the 
cost of restoring a contaminated natural resource, the public is still not 
made whole. First, restoration is never immediate, and the public loses 
some of the resource’s value for the period between the contamination 
and the restoration. Second, some damage can never be repaired.”). 




has occurred.  Also, there may be more than one possible 
source for the contamination.10  
Because of the speculative nature of the scientific 
evidence used to substantiate a natural resource damage 
claim, its reliability should be called into question and 
thoroughly examined.  Evidentiary requirements for 
causation in a natural resource action under CERCLA should 
be loosened in order to duplicate the quasi strict liability 
standards imposed on a plaintiff in a remediation action to 
reflect Congress’ intention.11  The imposition of such a 
standard will reduce the requirement for the expensive and 
impractical gathering of scientific evidence.  This would, in 
turn, empower the Natural Resource Trustee with the 
requisite resources to be more proactive in combating future 
pollution.  It would also allow the trustee to restore the 
damaged natural resource to its baseline condition and give 
the trustee the ability to purchase coastal land for 
conservation purposes.   
 
II. SOURCES AND CONSEQUENCES OF 
SHELLFISH CONTAMINATION 
  
Shellfish are particularly vulnerable to contamination 
present in the coastal waterways they occupy.12  The shellfish 
(e.g., oysters, clams, scallops) commonly found in the 
Northeast, known as “bivalve mollusks,” thrive in shallow 
                                                 
10  Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 659 F.Supp 1269, 1283 
(D.Del.1987) (“[I]f the release or threatened release of contaminants from 
the Site was a substantial factor in causing [Plaintiffs] to incur costs, 
[Defendants] may not escape liability merely because other causes…have 
contributed to the result”). 
11  Patrick D. Taylor, Liability of Past Owners: Does CERCLA 
Incorporate a Causation-Based Standard?, 35 S.TEX.L.REV. 535, 544–45 
(1994) (Author argues that Congress intended to implement a strict 
liability causation standard in CERCLA natural resource damage actions). 
12  Ian Dore, Shellfish: A Guide to Oysters, Mussels, Scallops, Clams 
and Similar Products for the Commercial User 15–17 (Van Nostrand 
Reinhold ) (1991). 




coastal waters located near freshwater flows.13  Essentially, 
they feed by filtering water and extracting the organisms 
within.14  As a direct result of their feeding behavior, shellfish 
frequently absorb toxins, bacteria, disease causing 
microorganisms (pathogens), metals, and other pollutants that 
may be present in the water.15  Many factors influence the 
success of shellfish populations, but due to the physical 
characteristics of the species, water quality is paramount.16  
Unfortunately, shallow coastal waterways, where shellfish 
thrive, often serve as repositories for pollutants.17   
Although there are many sources that lead to the 
contamination of the shellfish population, CERCLA is best 
designed to combat the problem of pollution specifically in 
the form of releases18 of hazardous substances, pollutants or 
contaminants that find their way into coastal waters.  Rhode 
Island’s experience with the Naval Construction Battalion 
Center in North Kingstown is a prime example of CERCLA’s 
applicability in recovering for a contaminated shellfish 
source.   
From 1939 until 2001, the Navy owned and operated a 
landfill on several large parcels of property adjacent to Allan 
Harbor in Narragansett Bay.19  The Navy disposed of 
hazardous substances on the property, such as 
methylmercury, which eventually seeped into the harbor and 
accumulated in surrounding shellfish.20  The State of Rhode 
                                                 
13  Id. 
14  Id. 
15  Id. 
16  Id. 
17  Id. 
18  CERCLA defines a "release" as "any spilling, leaking, pumping, 
pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, 
dumping, or disposing into the environment . . . " 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) 
(2002). 
19  Turn to 10, Navy Will Pay $1.4 Million For Environmental Damage 
In R.I., (Jan. 12, 2006),  
http://www.turnto10.com/news/6029697/detail.html?subid=10101342 
(last visited May 31, 2006). 
20  Id. 




Island indefinitely closed the area to harvesting shellfish in 
1984. 21  The State of Rhode Island, acting in their capacity as 
Natural Resource Trustee, brought a natural resource damage 
action to recover for the lost use of the shellfish resource, 
among other things.22  In a final settlement, the U.S. Navy 
agreed to compensate the State of Rhode Island $1.4 million 
for damages to natural resources.23 
The availability of an uncontaminated shellfish resource 
is imperative for three major reasons: (1) avoiding harmful 
effects on human health; (2) avoiding economic harm; and, 
(3) preserving the coastal eco-system.  
 
A. Human Health Considerations 
 
Perhaps the most compelling reason for addressing 
shellfish contamination is eliminating the potential threat to 
human health.  Although shellfish contain considerable 
nutritional value24 and have been consumed for centuries,25 
disease and illness are constantly attributed to shellfish 
consumption.26  Not surprisingly, the disease and illness 
originate from unsanitary conditions that are sometimes 
present in the water at shellfish harvesting areas.27 
Generally, state and local governments are charged with 
the responsibility of preventing the consumption of 
contaminated shellfish.28  In the event of contamination, the 
                                                 
21  Id. 
22  Id. 
23  Id. 
24  Institute of Medicine, supra note 4, at 1 (“[S]hellfish are nutritious 
foods that constitute desirable components of a healthy diet.”). 
25  Katherine Szabo, Prehistoric Shellfish Gathering, 
http://www.manandmollusc.net/history_food.net. (Last visited Apr. 10, 
2006). 
26  J. David Clem, Historical Overview, Environmental Indicators and 
Shellfish Safety 1, 1–29 (Cameron R. Hackney & Merle D. Pierson eds., 
1994). 
27  Id. 
28  Environmental Protection Agency, EPA’s Recommendations on the 
Use of Fish and Shellfish Consumption Advisories (October 24, 2000), 
www.epa.gov/waterscience/library//wqstandards/shellfish.pdf (last visited 




State’s Department of Health will issue consumption 
advisories to the general population or close shellfish beds 
entirely.29 Despite the government’s good faith attempts to 
regulate shellfish consumption, a substantial portion of 
shellfish is caught by recreational fisherman and may be 
consumed absent any regulation.30  The availability of a 
shellfish resource safe for consumption is contingent upon a 
clean harvesting area.31 
 
B. Economic Considerations 
 
Native shellfish are responsible for providing 
employment and fueling economic trade in certain coastal 
regions; depletion in the availability of the resource affects 
those who depend on the resource.32  Although coastal 
regions in the United States do not currently rely on natural 
resource industries the way they have in the past, the shellfish 
industry maintains tremendous economic value.33 Moreover, 
when one considers the residual effects of related industries, 
such as boat and truck sales, retail sales, restaurants, 
                                                                                                     
December 13, 2006); see also Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 
U.S.C. §§ 342(a)(1)-(7) (2005).   
29  Environmental Protection Agency, supra note 28. 
30  Institute of Medicine, supra note 4, at 2 (“One-fifth of the fish and 
shellfish eaten in the United States is derived from recreational or 
subsistence fishing, and these products are not subject to health-based 
control; there is need to improve protection for consumers of these 
products by regulation of harvest and by education concerning risks 
associated with their consumption.”). 
31  Dore supra note 12,at 17. 
32  Dick White, Shellfisherman Will Feel Impact First, N. B. Std. 
Times, April 30, 2003 at A1,  at http://www.s-t.com/daily/04-03/04-30-
03/a01lo010.htm (Discussing the impact of an oil spill on local 
shellfisherman).   
33  EPA, State of the New England Environment, (1996), 
http://www.epa.gov/NE/soe/coastal.html (last visited April 23, 2006) 
(“The commercial shellfish harvest is worth about $200 million per year 
to the region and represents a livelihood for thousands of people.”). 




wholesaling and packing and tourism, the total value of the 
shellfish industry is incalculable.34 
 
C. Ecological Considerations 
 
Throughout history, man has held a misconception that 
the ocean is a limitless resource, incapable of being damaged 
by human hands.35  Passage of time and numerous scientific 
studies have proved that human activity is directly 
responsible for immeasurable damage to coastal waters.36  
The ocean is a complex ecosystem where species are 
intricately connected to one another; contamination of the 
shellfish population has unknown ramifications on the plants 
and other species that live within the same coastal ecosystem 
and feed on the resource.  Unfortunately, current laws and 
policies tend to “emphasize use instead of protection and 
preservation, individual resources instead of interconnected 
ecosystems, problems of recent origin instead of historical 
accumulations of human-induced marine degradation.”37  
 
III. THE NATURE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
AND EXPERT TESTIMONY 
 
 Success in a natural resource damage action involving 
shellfish contamination case will hinge on highly 
sophisticated technical scientific evidence, in conjunction 
with the testimony of experts, specifically used in proving 
causation and in quantifying damages.38 Environmental 
                                                 
34  Gregg R. Rivara, Water Quality and Shellfish on Long Island 
(2002), http://www.nywea.org/ 
clearwaters/02-fall/waterqualityands.html (last visited June 6, 2006).  
35  Robin Kundis Craig, Taking the Long View of Ocean Ecosystems: 
Historical Science, Marine Restoration, and the Oceans Act of 2000, 29 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 649, 651 (2002). 
36  Id. at 652 (“[H]umans are degrading—sometimes even destroying—
large areas of the oceans and the biodiversity that they contain.”). 
37  Id. at 651. 
38  Keun J. Park, Judicial Utilization of Scientific Evidence in Complex 
Environmental Torts: Redefining Litigation Driven Research, 7 FORDHAM 




litigation is “document intensive, involves a great deal of 
discovery, expert witnesses, and often a huge amount of 
technical data with their own concepts and language.”39  
Accordingly, the environmental advocate must take full 
advantage of the Federal Rules of Evidence and existing case 
law to ensure that all of the relevant scientific evidence and 
expert testimony has a chance to be presented at trial. 
 The introduction of scientific evidence at trial is a routine 
practice during CERCLA litigation and, very often, it serves 
as the most critical factor for determining liability.40  The 
admissibility of scientific evidence stems from the standards 
established in Frye v. United States,41 which requires that the 
proponent of scientific evidence demonstrate that the 
scientific theory and the method used to develop that theory 
is “generally accepted within the relevant scientific 
community.”42   
In 1993, the Supreme Court departed from the venerable 
Frye test when it decided Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
43  Daubert held that Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702 is the new standard for determining the 
admissibility of scientific evidence and it further established a 
“gatekeeping” role for federal district courts that requires an 
independent judicial assessment of reliability based on 
several defined factors.44    
                                                                                                     
ENVTL. L.J. 483, 491–92 (1996) (“For example, proving causation of 
incurrence of response costs under the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), is frequently 
determinable only by reference to scientific opinion”).   
39  Id. at 485. 
40  Id. 
41  293 F. 1013, at 1013–14 (C.A.D.C 1923). 
42  State v. Garcia, 197 Ariz. 79, 3 P.3d 999, 1002 (1999) (“Under 
Frye, the admissibility of novel scientific evidence depends on whether 
the evidence sought to be introduced is derived from a scientific theory or 
principle that has achieved general acceptance in the relevant scientific 
community”). 
43  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
44  Judith A. Hasko, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: 
Flexible Judicial Screening of Scientific Expert Evidence Under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 702, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 479(1995) (When making its 




In 1999, the Supreme Court decided Kumho Tire v. 
Carmichael,45 which held that Daubert applies to all expert 
testimony, not just scientific testimonial evidence.46  
Furthermore, the court clarified that it is not necessary that all 
of the factors mentioned in Daubert be present to make the 
evidence admissible.47 
As with any type of evidence introduced at trial, the 
admissibility of scientific evidence turns on its relevancy.48  
The burden is placed on the party that seeks to have the 
evidence admitted to specify what issues it relates to and 
show how it rationally advances the inquiry about that 
issue.49  Ultimately, the trial court judge is responsible for 
making the final determination of which evidence will be 
admissible at trial.50     
A natural resource damage action involving shellfish 
contamination will involve highly technical information or 
analysis that is most likely beyond the knowledge of the 
typical juror and therefore, will require the testimony of an 
expert. Despite its ability to influence a jury “because of its 
aura of special reliability and trustworthiness,”51 expert 
                                                                                                     
determination regarding the admission of scientific evidence, the court 
will evaluate several factors: (1) whether the scientific theory or technique 
has been empirically tested; (2) whether the scientific theory or technique 
has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or 
potential rate for error; (4) the expert’s qualifications and stature in the 
scientific community; (5) whether the results can be replicated by other 
experts elsewhere; and, (6) whether the technique and its results can be 
explained with sufficient clarity so that the court and the jury can 
understand its plain meaning).  
45  526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
46  Id. at 151–58. 
47  Id.  
48  Evidence is considered relevant when it has “any tendency to make 
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 401. 
49  Id. 
50  FED. R. EVID. 104(a). 
51  United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973). 




testimony synthesizes and explains the intricacies of the 
evidence being presented at trial.   
Unlike eyewitnesses or parties subject to litigation, expert 
witnesses testify based on their own experience and 
knowledge and are allowed to apply their expertise to the 
facts of the case.52  A scientist holding an advanced academic 
degree in a field that sufficiently relates to the issue in dispute 
is usually qualified as an expert.53 Trial courts are given 
broad discretion in making the final decision as to whether a 
witness qualifies as an expert based on the “facts and 
circumstances of the particular case.”54 
The role of the scientific expert at trial differs completely 
from his or her role in the scientific world.  In the scientific 
world, the scientist seeks to achieve certainty through 
repetition.  However, in the courtroom, the plaintiff does not 
have the obligation to prove his case to a scientific 
“certainty,” but rather, to a standard of a preponderance of the 
evidence.55  Justice Blackmun noted this distinction in 
Daubert: 
                                                 
52  Expert testimony is guided by the Federal Rules of Evidence 702. 
The rule states: “If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a 
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an 
opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or 
data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, 
and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the 
facts of the case.” FED. R. EVID. 702. 
53  Id.  
54  Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1179 (1999) (“Rule 702 
grants the district judge the discretionary authority, reviewable for its 
abuse, to determine reliability in light of the particular facts and 
circumstances of the particular case”).    
55  Kimberly C. Harris, Use and Examination of Experts In 
Environmental Litigation, 50 AM. JUR. Trials 471 §3.  The role of expert 
proof in environmental litigation (updated 2005).  (“[E]nvironmental 
litigation often involves an array of competing scientific ‘facts’ as to 
which some ‘certainty’ is sought.  Indeed, even scientific facts are not 
certain, but only theories with high probabilities of validity.  Scientific 
experts typically speak not of certainty, but of probability.  For that 
reason, the resolution of many disputed environmental cases turns on the 





It is true that open debate is an essential part of 
both legal and scientific analyses.  Yet there 
are important differences between the quest 
for truth in the courtroom and the quest for 
truth in the laboratory.  Scientific conclusions 
are subject to perpetual revision.  Law, on the 
other hand, must resolve disputes finally and 
quickly.  The scientific project is advanced by 
broad and wide-ranging consideration of a 
multitude of hypotheses, for those that are 
incorrect will eventually be shown to be so, 
and that in itself is an advance.  Conjectures 
that are probably wrong are of little use, 
however, in the project of reaching a quick, 
final, and binding legal judgment—often of 
great consequence—about a particular set of 
events in the past.56 
 
 Furthermore, when determining whether a proffer of 
scientific evidence is sufficiently reliable, it is important to 
consider “whether the experts are proposing to testify about 
matters growing naturally and directly out of research they 
have conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they 
have developed their opinions expressly for purposes of 
testifying.”57  If the experts developed their opinions 
expressly for the purposes of testifying, then “proof that the 
research and analysis supporting the proffered conclusions 
have been subjected to normal scientific scrutiny through 
peer review and publication” is required.58 
Claims and litigation involving contamination of a 
shellfish resource include the expertise of highly skilled 
                                                                                                     
resolution of scientific or technical issues.  Both tasks that a is not 
prepared to handle without the assistance of experts”). 
56  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 589, 596–97 (1993).  
57  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1318 (9th Cir. 
1995) (hereinafter “Daubert II”). 
58  Id. at 1318. 




professionals such as biologists, chemists, civil engineers, 
hydrologists, physicians and economists as both fact and 
expert witnesses.  These experts have the difficult 
responsibility of analyzing various scientific theories and 
simplifying them for the comprehension of the jury.  This 
type of complex environmental litigation will frequently 
involve complex scientific uncertainties that go beyond the 
comprehension of the average juror.59  The prospect of 
obtaining absolute scientific certainty at trial is unrealistic.  
Rather, the jury is charged with the responsibility of 
determining liability based on one of many potentially 
credible scientific theories.60   
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that 
environmental litigation requires a special understanding of 
the nature of scientific evidence: 
 
Undoubtedly, certainty is the scientific ideal— 
to the extent that even science can be certain 
of its truth. But certainty in the complexities of 
environmental medicine may be achievable 
only after the fact, when scientists have the 
opportunity for leisurely and isolated scrutiny 
of an entire mechanism61 
 
                                                 
59  Susan E. Cowell, Pretrial Mediation of Complex Scientific Cases: A 
Proposal to Reduce Jury and Judicial Confusion, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
981, 981–82 (2000). 
60  Howard T. Markey, Jurisprudence or “Juriscience”?, 25 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 525, 526–28 (1984); see also Scott C. Whitney, The Case 
for Creating a Special Environmental Court System, 14 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 473, 477–82 (1973);Scott C. Whitney, The Case for Creating a 
Special Environmental Court System– A Further Comment, 15 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 33, 45 (1973). (Parenthetical information is encouraged 
after using “see also”).  
61  Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 25 
(D.C. Cir. 1976). Author combined the words of the judge with footnote 
#52 of this case to get this quote, therefore it was cut out. 




IV. THE FRAMEWORK OF THE COMPREHENSIVE 
ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, 
AND LIABILITY ACT 
 
Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980, primarily as a means 
of curing past pollution and preventing future pollution as a 
result of discharges of hazardous substances.62  In addition to 
compensating landowners and governments for the 
remediation of contaminated sites, CERLCA authorizes 
“natural resource trustees”63 to recover compensatory 
“damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural 
resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such 
injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release.”64  
In other words, the statute provides the natural resource 
trustee with the ability to achieve two broad objectives: (1) 
the cleanup of sites contaminated by hazardous waste and (2) 




                                                 
62  Peter M. Manus, Federalism Under Siege at the Rocky Mountain 
Arsenal: Preemption and CERCLA After United States v. Colorado, 19 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 327, 352 (1994) (“According to its legislative 
history, CERCLA was enacted ‘to establish a comprehensive response 
and financing mechanism to abate and control the vast problems 
associated with abandoned and inactive hazardous waste disposal sites.’” 
quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1016(I), 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) 22, reprinted 
in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N (94 Stat.). 6119, 6125). 
63  Natural resource trustees are federal, state, or Indian tribe officials 
designated to act on behalf of the public as trustees for natural resources. 
42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (2000); see also Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. 
Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982) (“State governments may act in 
their parens patriae capacity as representatives for all their citizens in a 
suit to recover damages for injury to a sovereign interest”); Alaska Sport 
Fishing Association v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 773 (9th Cir. 1994) (“A 
state has a sovereign interest in natural resources within its boundaries”). 
64  42 U.S.C § 9607(a)(4)(C) (2000); see also Patrick T. Michael, III, 
Natural Resource Damages Under CERCLA: The Emerging Champion of 
Environmental Enforcement, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 185, 190 (1992). 
65  Patrick T. Michael III, supra note 64, at 189. 




A. REMEDIATION ACTION 
 
CERCLA’s primary purpose was to address pollution 
situations involving sites that were formerly used for the 
disposal of hazardous waste.66  The statute sets forth a 
detailed remediation process for investigating the source of 
pollution, identification of the responsible party, and 
providing financial resources necessary to clean up the 
polluted sites.67   
Although this note focuses specifically on a CERCLA 
action for natural resource damages, it is important to set 
forth the process of a remediation action because the natural 
resource trustee will be responsible for meeting the elements 
of a remediation action before it can recover for natural 
resource damages.68  The plaintiff must establish the 
following four elements to impose liability under section 107 
of CERCLA: (1) the defendant falls within one of the four 
categories of “responsible parties”; (2) the hazardous 
substances are disposed at a “facility”; (3) there is a “release” 
or threatened release of hazardous substances from the 
facility into the environment; and, (4) the release causes the 
incurrence of “response costs.”69 
The causation element that creates obstacles under 
common law principles and in CERCLA natural resource 
damage actions is less troublesome in remediation cases.  In 
Krygoski Construction Co., Inc. v. City of Menominee, the 
court defined the modern view of the causation element in a 
CERCLA remediation: “Although liability under CERCLA is 
                                                 
66  Dedham Water Co. Inc. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 972 F.2d 
453 (1st Cir. 1992).  
67  55 Fed. Reg. 6154–57 (Feb. 21, 1990). 
68  Carol E. Dinkins & Kristie M. Tice, New Solutions For Old 
Problems in Newark Bay, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 60, 65 (1998). 
69  42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2000); see also United States v. Alcan 
Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 258–59 (3rd Cir.1992); United States v. 
Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1378–79 (8th Cir.1989),Blake 
A. Watson, Liberal Construction of CERCLA Under The Remedial 
Purpose Canon: Have The Lower Courts Taken a Good Thing Too Far?, 
20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 199, 279 (1996). 




strict, . . .  a CERCLA plaintiff  still shoulders the burden of 
alleging and proving an unbroken chain of events occurred 
which bridged his necessary response costs to the defendant’s 
conduct.”70 
Without a doubt, the use of scientific evidence plays an 
integral role during a remediation action under CERCLA.  
“The  ‘expert's opinion as to fate and transport of chemicals 
in the soil and groundwater may be the sole means of 
interpreting evidence at trial, and the use of medical and 
toxicological experts the principle means of attempting to 
bring rationality to the issue of 'how clean is clean’."'71  The 
scientific tests and analysis performed through the 
remediation process “play an integral role in the evaluation of 
site conditions.”72 
 
B. NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ACTION 
 
CERCLA also provides a method for the natural resource 
trustee to recover for “injury to, destruction of, or loss of 
natural resources . . .” on behalf of the public.73  Clearly, a 
natural resource damage action is the logical method for 
recovery after contamination of the shellfish resource caused 
                                                 
70  431 F. Supp.2d 755, 763 (W.D. Mich. 2006) (quoting Rhodes v. 
County of Darlington, South Carolina, 833 F. Supp. 1163, 1190 (D.S.C. 
1992)); see also Dedham Water Co. Inc., 889 F.2d 1146, at 1152 
(Liability for response costs under CERCLA section 107 requires only a 
minimal connection).  
71  Park, supra note 38, at 492 (quoting Steven P. McDonald & Jon K. 
Wactor, Practicing in the Brave New World of Scientific Litigation Post 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow, RECORDER, Oct. 5, 1994, at 10). 
72  Id. 
73  42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (2000); see generally Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Interior, 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also 42 U.S.C § 9601(16) 
(2000) (A natural resource is defined by CERCLA as: “[L]and, fish, 
wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water supplies, and 
other such resources belonging to, managed by, held in trust by, 
appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by the United States…any State 
or local government, any foreign government, any Indian tribe, or, if such 
resources are subject to a trust restriction on alienation, any member of an 
Indian tribe.”)  




by a release of a hazardous substance.  “A natural resource 
damage action essentially is a tort action . . .” brought by the 
government on behalf of the general public.74  The elements 
for establishing a prima facie case in natural resource damage 
action is discussed in the next section. 
 
V. UTILIZING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE TO MAKE A 
PRIMA FACIE CASE IN A NATURAL RESOURCE 
DAMAGE LAWSUIT 
 
 The first step in the natural resource damage recovery 
process is establishing “baseline.”  Baseline is defined as "the 
condition or conditions that would have existed at the 
assessment area had the discharge of oil or release of 
hazardous substance under investigation not occurred".75   
Next, the natural resource trustee is responsible for 
establishing the “causal link” between the release of the 
hazardous substance and the injury to the natural resource.76 
Unfortunately, the standard for determining the causal link in 
natural resource damage actions has been subject to many 
interpretations.77  Despite its appearance as a strict liability 
standard for causation, the few courts that have addressed the 
causation issue in a natural resource damage case have 
determined that the plaintiff is required to at least make a 
minimal showing of proximate causation.78   
To meet that causation standard, the plaintiff is charged 
with fingerprinting the sources of pollution or the cause of 
injury to a shellfish resource.  This is a task that involves 
scientific research performed over the course of years.  
Detecting pollutants in the ocean and determining the 
                                                 
74  See Dinkins & Tice, supra note 68, at 65. 
75  43 C.F.R. § 11.14(e) (2005). 
76  See Dinkins & Tice, supra note 68, at 65. 
77  See Mendel, supra note 5, at 101–04. 
78  Id.; see also Ohio v. United States Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 
470 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("There is little evidence, however, that Congress 
specifically intended to ease the standard of proof for showing that a 
particular spill caused a particular biological injury."). 




pathway those pollutants took to arrive at their final 
destination can be daunting.79  Because shellfish 
contamination rarely occurs on the actual site in which there 
was a release of hazardous substances, the Natural Resource 
Trustee has the added difficulty of holding the owners of 
adjacent sites liable for the damages. 
Proving that specific pollutants were the proximate cause 
of injury presents even more difficulties.  The time 
restrictions, the nature of litigation and making a final 
determination of causation can easily be disputed.  Because 
the scientific expert’s ultimate determination will conclude 
only after the analysis of technical scientific data and 
theories, the credibility of the experts who testify at trial 
becomes an issue on which the litigation will turn, creating a 
so called “battle of the experts.”80   
Recently, the 9th circuit Federal Court of Appeals had 
reason to closely examine the nature of microbiologist expert 
testimony in shellfish contamination litigation when it 
decided Clausen v. M/V New Carissa.81  Although the case 
does not deal specifically with scientific evidence in regard to 
a CERCLA natural resource damage action, it provides 
valuable insight into the battle of the experts and the nebulous 
nature of proving causation in a natural resource damage case 
specifically involving shellfish.82 
                                                 
79  Clifford Fisher, The Role of Causation in Science as Law and 
Proposed Changes in the Current Common Law Toxic Tort System, 9 
BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 35, 60 (2001) (“In nearly every tort action, the plaintiff 
must prove causation. Causation involves a two-step analysis. The first 
step is factual causation and the second is proximate causation. Factual 
causation is used to determine whether there is a connection between the 
allegedly tortuous conduct and the plaintiff's injury. This cause-effect 
relationship is the part of environmental law that is difficult for the victim 
to prove”). 
80  Richard B. Racine, Jeffrey A. Lindeman & Katherine B. Davis, The 
Battle Over Science in the Courtroom, 42-FEB FED. LAW. 36 (1995).  
81  339 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2003). 
82  Gerald F. George, Litigation of Claims For Natural Resource 
Damages, SD88 ALI-ABA 631, 633 (1999) (“Federal statutory authority 
for recovery of natural resource damages has existed since the 1977 
amendments to the Clean Water Act and the passage of CERCLA in 




In Clausen, a vessel carrying 400,000 gallons of bunker 
and diesel fuel spilled approximately 70,000 gallons of oil 
into Coos Bay, Oregon, the richest oyster growing area in 
Oregon.83  A report prepared by federal and state agencies 
concluded that the oil from the vessel was responsible for the 
death of approximately 3.5 million oysters.84  Accordingly, 
the owners and operators of a commercial oyster farm 
“brought suit against the New Carissa and its corporate 
owners and operators in federal district court, alleging claims 
under the Federal Oil Pollution Act85 and the Oregon Oil 
Spill Act.”86  
To establish the requisite causation, the oyster farmers 
offered testimony from a marine biologist.87  It was the 
opinion of the plaintiff’s marine biologist that the oil caused 
the oysters to develop lesions, which became infected, and 
ultimately caused their death.88  The defendants countered the 
plaintiff’s argument with testimony from their own marine 
biologist who also determined that the oysters, in fact, had 
developed lesions.89 However, it was the defendant’s opinion 
that the lesions were caused by low salinity in bay due to 
heavy rainfalls.90 
Both experts reached their conclusions after examining 
the same six potential causes for the lesions in oysters: “(1) 
infectious disease; (2) freezing trauma; (3) acute toxic effects 
of non-oil contaminants; (4) acute toxic effects of oil; (5) low 
salinity; and (6) low-level toxic effects of oil.”91 Both experts 
were able to definitively “rule out” causes one through four 
                                                                                                     
1980.  However, despite the increasing number of claims, there is still 
limited case law on most issues, and almost no cases have been fully 
litigated”). 
83  Clausen, 339 F.3d at 1051–52. 
84  Id. at 1152. 
85  Federal Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (1990). 
86  OR. REV. STAT. § 468B.300 (2005); see Clausen, 339 F.3d at 1052. 
87  Id. 
88  Id. at 1053. 
89  Id. 
90  Id. 
91  Id. 




“as the ultimate cause of the oyster deaths.”92 Predictably, the 
plaintiff’s expert determined that the low-level toxic effects 
of oil were responsible for the lesions on the oysters and the 
defendant’s expert was of the opinion that low levels of 
salinity in the water caused the lesions.93  
Prior to trial, the defendant’s moved to exclude the 
proffered testimony of the plaintiff’s marine biologist on the 
grounds that it was not sufficient under the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Daubert.94  The court denied the motion to exclude 
and the plaintiff’s expert witness was able to testify at trial.95  
On appeal, the court rejected the defendant’s complaint that 
the plaintiff’s expert lacked sufficient scientific basis to "rule 
in" contact toxicity and that the admission of such expert 
testimony constitutes an abuse of discretion.96  
 
A. CALCULATING NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES 
 
Finally, the natural resource trustee is responsible for 
proving damages to and placing a value on the natural 
resource.97  One of the most contentious issues involving 
expert testimony in environmental litigation is the 
quantification and valuation of damages to the natural 
resources destroyed by pollution.  Natural resource 
“[d]amages are measured by the services these assets provide 
and how an alteration in their condition impairs the ability of 
the natural assets to continue to provide these services.”98  To 
make these important determinations, experts will refer to the 
Natural Resource Damage Assessment (“NRDA”) 
                                                 
92  Id. 
93  Id. 
94  Id. at 1055; see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. 509 U.S. 579 
(1993). 
95  Clausen, 339 F.3d at 1055. 
96  Id. at 1059 (“The ship owners’ primary argument on appeal . . . [is] 
that [the expert’s] use of methodology was unreliable because he should 
never have ruled in low-level toxic effects of oil as a potential cause of 
the oyster mortality.”). 
97  Daubert, 509 U.S. 579. 
98 See Lowell, supra note 2, at 176. 




regulations promulgated by the Department of the Interior, 
which “provide a framework to calculate compensatory 
monetary damages necessary to restore the natural resources 
to their “baseline” condition, and a methodology for 
calculating resource services lost to the public.”99 
During the valuation process, economists attempt to place 
a value on the natural resources by evaluating two criteria: 
“the choice being made to consume or use the service,” and 
“public exclusion, appropriation, or regulation over the 
natural resource.”100  When a coastal waterway is 
contaminated with pollution and the shellfish resource is 
destroyed or off limits to fishing for a period of time, the 
value of the shellfish is quantified “by lost profits determined 
by directly observable market behavior.”101   
Assessing the damage to the natural resource can cause 
confusion. Section 301(c)(2) of CERCLA calls for the natural 
resource damage assessment regulations in the following 
terms: 
 
Such regulations should specify: (A) standard 
procedures for simplified assessments 
requiring minimal field observation, including 
establishing measures of damages based on 
units of discharge or release or units of 
affected area, and (B) alternative protocols for 
conducting assessments in individual cases to 
determine the type and extent of short and 
long-term injury, destruction, or loss. Such 
regulations shall identify the best available 
procedures to determine such damages, 
including both direct and indirect injury, 
                                                 
99  42 U.S.C. § 9651(c) (2000). Shannon Kaster, Natural Resource 
Damage Assessments, 15 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 114, 115 (2000). 
100  See Lowell, supra note 2, at 176–77 (quoting Raymond J. Kopp & 
V. Kerry Smith, Understanding Damages to Natural Assets, In VALUING 
NATURAL ASSETS: The Economics Of Natural Resource Damage 
Assessment 6, 1013 (Raymond J. Kopp & V. Kerry Smith eds., 1993)).  
101  Id. at 177. 




destruction, or loss and shall take into 
consideration factors, including, but not 
limited to, replacement value, and ability of 
the ecosystem or resource to recover.102  
 
These regulations have been classified as “Type A” and 
“Type B” procedures.103  Both procedures consist of three 
steps in assessing damage: an Injury Determination phase, a 
Quantification phase, and a Damage Determination phase.104   
During the Injury Determination phase, the assessment 
focuses on determining that an injury to the resource has 
occurred and that the injury has resulted from the discharge 
or release.105  After the injury is confirmed, the assessment 
moves into the Quantification phase.106 The focus is 
identifying the services provided by the resource, determining 
the baseline level of such services, and quantifying the 
reduction in services resulting from the discharge or 
release.107  In the damage determination phase, where focus is 
on economic valuation or costing techniques, the monetary 
compensation for injury is calculated, based on either the 
restoration or replacement costs or the loss in use value of the 
resources.108  The use value of a natural resource is nothing 
more than the economic value of the resource to the people 
who utilize them.109 
Beyond having economic value, natural resources are 
recognized as possessing a certain intrinsic value, which 
                                                 
102  CERCLA Chapter 301(c)(2). I believe that it would be cited as: 42 
U.S.C § 9651(c)(2) (2005). 
103  Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L. 
REV. 269, 275 (1989). 
104  J. Terrance Ryan, The Evolution of Natural Resource Damage 
Assessments Under the Oil Pollution Act and the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 6 FORDHAM 
ENVTL. L.J. 29, 35–42 (1994). 
105  Id.  
106  Id.  
107  Id.  
108  Id.  
109  Id. at 281. 




cannot be quantified by performing an economic analysis.110  
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged the abstract 
exercise of placing a monetary value on natural resources: 
 
While it is not irrational to look at market 
price as one factor in determining the use 
value of a resource, it is unreasonable to view 
market price as the exclusive factor, or even 
the predominant one.  From the bald eagle to 
the blue whale and snail darter, natural 
resources have values that are not fully 
captured by the market system.111 
 
It is widely believed that placing an economic value on 
natural resources using NRDA regulations “allows courts to 
assess damages for environmental harm, deters future 
pollution, and helps ensure protection for natural 
ecosystems.”112  On the other hand, some legal commentators 
have been critical of natural resource damages for having 
unreliable standards for assessing values, placing too much 
weight to the speculation of economists and placing an undue 
burden on business and industry.113 
                                                 
110  See Lowell, supra note 2, at 177–78 (“For example, phytoplankton 
in and of themselves are surely not worth much in their individual 
capacity, but when one considers that phytoplankton serve as the base of 
the food chain on which all marine life thrives and requires for its very 
existence, their worth may be invaluable”); see Cross, supra note 104, at 
292–93. 
111  State of Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 462–63 (D.C. 
Cir. 1989). 
112  See Cross, supra note 104, at 270. 
113  See Anderson, supra note 5, at 486–87. (“Both the DOI and NOAA 
regulations clearly give government trustees broad discretion to assess 
natural resource damages using a wide range of methods, some of which 
may not withstand scientific scrutiny.”); see also Richard B. Stewart, 
Natural Resource Damages: The New Wave of Environmental Liability, 
THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY 1998, http://www.fed-
soc.org/Publications/practicegroupnewsletters/environmentallaw/el02010
1.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2005) (“Trustees are now mobilizing to assert 
ambitious NRD claims, threatening U.S. businesses and insurers and 






It is indisputable that shellfish contamination creates a 
negative impact on the economy, poses a serious risk to 
human health, and has a harmful effect on the fragile coastal 
ecosystems.  However, the litigation designed to redress the 
harmful effects of shellfish contamination produces 
uncounted difficulties.  Although a general public policy of 
preventing pollution has led Congress to enact and revise 
CERCLA, the application of such a statute has proven to be 
uncertain due to the enormous amount of discretion given to 
the trial courts in deciding admissibility of scientific evidence 
and testimony of experts.   
A CERCLA natural resource damage action designed to 
remedy shellfish contamination is the ultimate example of the 
awkward partnership of law and science, requiring a fact 
finder to base a legal conclusion on scientific uncertainties.  
Unfortunately, a causation standard that requires the natural 
resource trustee to provide a causal connection between the 
release and the injuries to natural resources, instead of the 
strict liability standard used in remediation actions, hinders 








                                                                                                     
federal agencies…with potentially enormous liabilities and massive 
transaction costs that go far beyond those recognized in any other country. 
Unless prompt steps are taken to reform the NRD programs, they will spin 
out of control”). 
